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MORTGAGING OUT AND RELATED PROBLEMS
RALPH R. NEUHOFFt
Under favorable conditions it is sometimes possible for a builder
of property to mortgage it when completed for a sum measurably in
excess of his cost, so that even before he sells the property or com-
mences to operate it, he has, economically speaking, a profit in cash
and in hand.
It is the purpose of this article to analyze the federal income tax law
applicable to such situations. The interplay between the philosophy
that increase of wealth should, in general, be subject to income
taxation and the doctrine that there must be an outward event before
an increase in economic wealth becomes taxable, has placed a burden
upon the courts which they may not have handled too well. Further-
more, Congress has singled out several situations for special discrimi-
natory treatment, probably in order to prevent a taxpayer from fol-
lowing through on the advantage gained by mortgaging out. Since the
legislation applicable to these special situations is not necessarily
called for by the logic of the situation, it is advisable for a taxpayer
operating in this general area to be informed of it.
I. HOW THE SITUATION MAY ARISE
Let us take a simple example:
A building contractor buys land for $15,000
He erects a building thereon at a cost of 85,000
Total $100,000
Let us suppose that by reason of his technical ability and industry
the builder was able to dispense with the services of an architect, a
surveyor and a general superintendent of construction, having per-
formed all of these functions himself, with the result that, aided pos-
sibly by a strongly rising market for this type of property, the
structure when completed is worth $130,000.
Let us suppose also that sooner or later he finds it possible to place
a mortgage upon the property for $115,000, and that the builder,
either by using a straw party, or in some other manner,1 is not per-
sonally liable upon the mortgage.
t Partner, Neuhoff & Schaefer, St. Louis, Missouri.
1. If the builder uses a separate corporation to carry out the transaction and
the corporation is able to "mortgage out," as we use that term, in other words,
to defray the entire cost of the project out of the proceeds of the loan and still
have funds remaining, it may be necessary to get the funds out of the corporation
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In this example:
The amount of the encumbrance is $115,000
The basis (disregarding depreciation deductions) is 100,000
Difference $ 15,000
For want of a better term we characterize this type of transaction
as "mortgaging out."2 Some learned authors have called this differ-
ence "negative basis." 3 It may be questioned whether this is a proper
term because actually the "basis," as that term is used in the Internal
Revenue Code, is positive and is equivalent to the cost in our example,
unless it has become necessary to subtract depreciation allowed or
allowable.4 Indeed, it is an axiom of income tax law that a basis of less
than zero is not permitted, so there never could be a negative basis
in that sense.
Let us say that the property is foreclosed. The results would be as
follows:
Foreclosure sale price (market value) $130,000
Basis 100,000
Difference $ 30,000
and into the hands of the owner-stockholder before he gains any advantage.
Such would be the case where the corporation would be vulnerable on a claim
for the deficiency. The various expedients utilized by the stockholder-owner to
possess himself of the funds may themselves incur a tax liability. As we shall
see under Section V, "Related Problems," infra, Congress has singled out some
of these transactions for special treatment. The question of the stockholder-
owner's liability to report income because he has possessed himself of the funds
referred to is distinct from the question of the liability on the corporation itself
for having mortgaged out.
2. Schlesinger, Disposition of Property Having a Negative Basis, N.Y.U. 15th
Inst. on Fed. Tax 339, 340 (1957), stated:
Although such liberal lending seems to have disappeared in today's
money market, during recent years it has been possible for a builder
to finance his entire construction cost out of mortgage proceeds. In this
procedure, commonly called 'mortgaging out,' the mortgagee has
depended principally on (a) the credit standing of the prospective
tenant, and (b) the certainty that there will be rental income for pay-
ment of the mortgage loan. The proposed construction cost of the
building and its intrinsic value for the purposes of resale, have been
secondary considerations.
3. Lurie, Mortgagors with "Negative Equities" and "Negative Bases," N.Y.U.
10th Inst. on Fed. Tax 71 (1952); Schlesinger, supra note 2, at 340.
4. Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 1016 (a).
5. In Beulah B. Crane, 3 T.C. 585, 591 (1944), aff'd, 331 U.S. 1 (1947), the
Tax Court held that basis could not be adjusted to a minus quantity. See also,
Jack L. Easson, 33 T.C. 963 (1960); Rev. Rul. 54-421, 1954-2 Cum. Bull. 162;
Surrey & Warren, Cases on Federal Income Taxation 645 (1960 ed.). In various
sections the Code takes care to prevent a basis from falling below zero, e.g.,
Int. Rev. Code of 1954, §§ 1021, 733, 357(c).
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The income tax law6 requires this difference to be taxed as income
to the building contractor or his corporation even though by reason
of the foreclosure sale the titleholder is being deprived of his property.
There is nothing improper about calling this a gain of $30,000, nor
is there anything improper about requiring the contractor to pay
income tax on this gain, for he will have received it in two increments
as follows:
1. On mortgaging out $15,000
2. On foreclosure an additional 15,0007
Total amount received $30,000
Take a different example, keeping the same cost of $100,000. As-
sume that the market value is only $105,000 but that, as before, the
mortgage placed on the property is $115,000. The equity will then be
as follows:
Mortgage $115,000
Value 105,000
Equity minus $ 10,000
The amount of this equity is negative. It means that the value of
the property is less than the mortgage. It is an economic term and is
correctly used.
Again let us suppose the property is foreclosed for its market value
and that the purchaser is not the mortgagee.
From the mortgagor's standpoint, the transaction is as follows:
Proceeds of foreclosure sale $105,000
Deduct basis to mortgagor 100,000
Taxable gain to mortgagor $ 5,000
From the mortgagee's standpoint, the transaction is as follows :"
Amount of mortgage $115,000
Deduct proceeds of foreclosure sale 105,000
Deficiency-bad debt $ 10,000
6. Compare Woodsam Associates, Inc. v. Commissioner, 198 F.2d 357 (2d Cir.
1952); I.T. 3135, 1937-2 Cum. Bull. 226; 1 P-H 1961 Fed. Tax Serv. 1 5554; with
Helvering v. Hammel, 311 U.S. 504 (1941); Schlesinger, Disposition of Property
Having a Negative Basis, N.Y.U. 15th Inst. on Fed. Tax 339 (1957).
7. Disregarding expense of sale, the $130,000 proceeds of the foreclosure sale
will be applied first to the payment of the mortgage of $15,000 and the balance
of $15,000 will be paid to the mortgagor.
8. See generally Treas. Reg. § 1.166-6 (1959), which indicates that where
a mortgagee does purchase at a foreclosure sale, contrary to the supposition in
our example, this might have two consequences, namely, a bad debt loss of the
difference between the sale price and the amount of the debt, and loss or gain
measured by the difference between ,the amount of the obligations of the debtor
which are applied to the purchase price and the fair market value of the property.
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Let us imagine two situations, one in which the mortgagor is
personally liable for the deficiency and the other in which he is not.9
1. Mortgagor Personally Liable
Excess cash-proceeds of mortgage $15,000
Less deficiency paid therefrom 10,000
Leaves free cash of $ 5,000
This is consistent because the property cost the builder $100,000
and it was sold under the mortgage for $105,000, resulting in a gain
of $5,000.
2. Mortgagor Not Personally Liable
Amount of mortgage $115,000
Proceeds of foreclosure sale applied 105,000
Deficiency $ 10,000
The deficiency of $10,000 is, of course, a loss to the mortgagee and it
is matched by tax free income in the hands of the mortgagor, as is
evident from the following:
Proceeds of the loan were $115,000
Less cost 100,000
Excess cash in hands of mortgagor $ 15,000
The sale was for $105,000
Deduct basis 100,000
Taxable gain to mortgagor $ 5,000
By hypothesis, mortgagor has received funds at the time of
mortgaging of $ 15,000
He was taxed on a gain of 5,000
Difference-tax free income $ 10,000
Speaking more generally, if property costs $100,000 and increases in
value to $130,000 and is mortgaged for something less than $130,000,
so that there is an adequate margin between the market value and the
9. In the ordinary case where the mortgage contains a covenant or promise
to pay the debt, or the debt is evidenced by a separate written obligation, there is
personal liability on the mortgagor for the whole amount of the debt and he may
be compelled to make good any deficiency. 59 C.J.S. Mortgages § 774 (1949). But
if the mortgage or note contains a stipulation that the mortgagee shall look only
to the mortgaged premises for the amount of his debt, or that no general execution
shall issue on foreclosure, there is no personal liability for the deficiency. Ibid.
This is, of course, different from the question whether the court may order pay-
ment of any deficiency in connection with the foreclosure suit. Under some
statutes, a deficiency judgment may not be entered in a foreclosure suit and the
mortgagee is relegated to an action at law for the deficiency. Id. § 777.
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amount of the mortgage, there will be no incentive to the owner to
let the property go for the mortgage even though he would have a
clear profit over cost by simply taking the mortgage money and for-
getting about the property.
On the other hand, if property costs $100,000 and does not increase
in value and is mortgaged, nevertheless, for anything over $100,000,
say for $115,000, there will, in many instances, be a strong incentive
to the owner to forget about the property and decamp with the
mortgage money intact. This is what is really meant by mortgaging
out. Also in this situation there would be a strong tendency to regard
the excess of the mortgage money over the cost as a gain. It has
been referred to as a windfall. It may result in a corresponding loss
to the mortgagee as in the example given above. In this view, the
property has been sold to the mortgagee. But observe that the dif-
ference is a gain or windfall only if the mortgage is not paid off when
it falls due. If the mortgage is paid off when due, the amount of the
mortgage compared with the cost is irrelevant-it cannot result in
economic gain. Considering the transaction as a whole, it might as
well have been anything.
Put another way-mortgaging out is against public policy only if
it results in a windfall, that is, if the mortgagor has a profit by simply
expending money to build and by finding a mortgagee willing to
reimburse him for the cost of the building plus a differential, without
having created any value by his effort. This can only happen if the
mortgage is not repaid.
Normally a mortgagee wants the money back when the loan falls
due and not the possession of the property. The reason for demanding
that there be an equity at the time of the loan is that this represents
the stake of the mortgagor, or the guarantee of good faith, or the
margin of safety of the mortgagee.
Where there is no equity there is no guarantee of good faith and
where there is a negative equity there is an incentive for bad faith.
It may be that the mortgagee is misled as to the amount of sound
value represented by a project. A lender may well assume that if the
design is right and the location is right, the fact that the money was
spent to produce the building guarantees as a practical matter that
the value is there. Obviously, one way of obtaining a loan in excess
of cost would be to mislead the lender as to the actual cost-pad it, in
other words.
Since the philosophy of the income tax law requires that income
tax shall be levied only on transactions, it is necessary for tax liability,
or possibly we should say tax accountability, that the transaction
under consideration shall have ended. If, in the examples which we
have given, the transaction under review is deemed to be started
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when the builder purchases the land and erects a building thereon, it
is necessary to fasten upon the end of the transaction. If a mortgage
is placed upon the property and the mortgage is later repaid, the
income tax law views this as a separate transaction irrelevant to the
determination of gain or loss upon the construction of the building.
However, as a matter of logic, it would be possible to make a separate
class out of situations where there was either actually no intention
of repaying a mortgage, or repayment was unlikely because it would
be disadvantageous to the mortgagor. In such cases the beginning
of the transaction could be deemed to be the purchase of the land and
the erection of the building; and the ending of the transaction could
be deemed to be the receipt from the mortgagee of the proceeds of
the mortgage if the proceeds exceeded the mortgagor's basis, and
therefore, economically, he already had a profit which he could reason-
ably expect to keep.
This condition would be satisfied whenever the proceeds of the
mortgage exceeded the basis and the mortgagor was under no com-
pulsion to repay the mortgage.
II. EXAMPLES
The following examples are designed to show the consequences of
excess or deficiency of market value with respect to the amount of
mortgage which governs the equity and of excess or deficiency of
market with respect to basis which governs the potential for gain
or loss :1 Case I
Cost of land and building (basis) $100,000
Market 130,000
Mortgage 100,000
Equity 30,000
c Excess of market over basis 30,000
Case II
Cost of land and building (basis) $100,000
Market 130,000
a Mortgage 115,000
Equity 15,000
c Excess of market over basis 30,000
Case III
Cost of land and building (basis) $100,000
Market 130,000
a Mortgage 130,000
Equity zero
c Excess of market over basis 30,000
10. In the following examples:
a-Indicates mortgaging out.
b-Indicates a negative equity.
c-Indicates market is higher than basis.
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Case IV
Cost of land and building (basis)
Market
a Mortgage
b Equity
Excess of market over basis
Case V
Cost of land and building (basis)
Market
a Mortgage
b Equity
c Excess of market over basis
Case VI
Cost of land and building (basis)
Market
Mortgage
Equity
Excess of market over basis
Case VII
Cost of land and building (basis)
Market
a Mortgage
b Equity
Excess of market over basis
Case VIII
Cost of land and building (basis)
Market
Mortgage
Equity
Excess of market over basis
$100,000
100,000
115,000
- 15,000
zero
$100,000
105,000
115,000
- 10,000
5,000
$100,000
100,000
100,000
zero
zero
$100,000
95,000
130,000
- S5,000
- 5,000
$100,000
95,000
95,000
zero
- 5,000
III. DEFINITIONS
Mortgaging out will be used to indicate any case where the
amount of the mortgage on property at the time it is made is greater
than the basis of the property given as security, regardless of whether
the market value justifies the amount of the mortgage.
Negative equity indicates that market value is less than the amount
of mortgage on the property at the time referred to.
Basis less than market indicates that the market value of the
property given as security is greater than its basis. It might be called
"potential for gain."
Basis means basis under the Internal Revenue Code which may
initially be equivalent to cost.
IV. BASIC PRINCIPLES
A. First Principle
Merely placing a mortgage on property, even though it is in excess
of the cost of the property given as security, does not, without more,
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result in taxable income.1 Case II above is an example, the propriety
of which would not be questioned. Case IV would apparently be im-
proper where the negative equity existed at the time that the mort-
gage was placed on the property, since the mortgagee obviously would
not intend that such a situation should arise and one would suspect
that he was induced to make the loan by misrepresentation of some
sort.
The first principle applies even where there is no personal liability
of the mortgagor.12 Where there is a positive equity such as in Case
II above, there is no incentive for the owner to let the property go
for the mortgage, even though he would have a clear profit over cost
by simply taking the mortgage money and forgetting about the
property. On the other hand, where there is no equity, as in Case IV,
there will be, in many instances, a strong incentive to the owner to
forget about the property. This is where mortgaging out probably got
its bad name. Apparently the motive of the mortgagor is immaterial,13
and this is so even where the mortgagor intends to let the property go
and, therefore, has, in his eyes, "sold" the property to the mortgagee.
As stated before, from practical considerations, an income tax
should only be applied to an identifiable event. Normally, this implies
that there has been a definite transaction which had a beginning
and an ending. The courts apparently feel that the placing of the
mortgage on the property is the beginning of a transaction and not
the ending of another transaction which began when the land was
bought and property was built.14 The rule could have been other-
wise, apparently, in examples such as Case IV above, at least to the
extent of putting the burden on the buyer to show that he did not
intend to let the property go upon foreclosure at the time he placed
the mortgage on the property.
We do know, of course, that every transaction which definitely
11. Woodsam Associates, Inc. v. Commissioner, 198 F.2d 357 (2d Cir. 1952).
See 1 Mertens, Law of Federal Income Taxation § 5.12 (Zimet, Stanley & Kill-
cullen rev. 1956, Supp. 1960), which states: "The mortgaging of property for an
amount in excess of its basis does not result in a realization of income even when
the mortgagor is not personally liable to repay the loan."
12. Woodsam Associates, Inc. v. Commissioner, supra note 11; Schlesinger,
supra note 6, at 341, citing Lurie, Mortgagor's Gain on Mortgaging Property for
More Than Cost Without Personal Liability, 6 Tax L. Rev. 319 (1951).
13. I am unable to find direct authority for this statement, but the discussion
in Woodsam Associates, Inc. v. Commissioner, supra note 12 is consistent.
14. Id. at 359. The court expressly declined to treat the borrowing as closing
the transaction, stating that the taxpayer merely augmented existing mortgage
indebtedness when she borrowed each time, and far from closing the venture,
remained in a position to borrow more if and when circumstances permitted and
she so desired, and accordingly, that she had never "disposed" of the property
to create a taxable event.
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increases one's wealth is not necessarily the occasion of an income
tax. For example, Knop v. United States15 held that a mere advan-
tageous purchase, without more, is not the occasion of an income tax.
In the Knop case the taxpayer bought a one-half interest in certain
land from her brother for $44,225 which was conceded to be worth
$67,500 at the time of the conveyance. She gave a note in payment,
which her brother had previously given her. The government claimed
that this was a trade or exchange of the note for something worth
$67,500 and since the basis of the note was considerably less, that
she had a capital gain. The court held that the payment of the note
was like the payment of cash and relied on the general principle that
merely making an advantageous purchase is not the occasion of in-
come from a taxable standpoint.
One should distinguish instances involving compensation for per-
sonal service. A strong case could be made for taxing the economic
gain where a taxpayer was in the business of building such houses and
the increase in market value was merely the result of his efforts, skill
and know-how which, in a different context, would earn compensation,
as, for example, when he performed the same services for someone
else for hire.16 Observe that pay for services rendered to others is
taxable when received even if received in property other than money,
but if one creates value in property by working for himself, this is
not income until sold or exchanged.
The doctrine applies to loans guaranteed under the National
Housing Act Amendments of 1942.-7 It also applies to mortgages
insured by the Federal National Mortgage Association."8
15. 234 F.2d 760 (8th Cir. 1956). See also Palmer v. Commissioner, 302 U.S.
63 (1937) and Fred Pellar, 25 T.C. 299 (1955), which held that taxpayers did
not receive income by virtue of construction of a residence for them where the
cost of construction and the fair value of the residence materially exceeded the
agreed price paid to the contractor. Possibly the Tax Court could have rested its
decision on the doctrine that a gift is not taxable income but instead it grounded
its decision on the doctrine that purchase of property for less than its value does
not of itself give rise to taxable income. See generally 1 Mertens, Law of Federal
Income Taxation § 5.13 (Zimet, Stanley & Killcullen rev. 1956, Supp. 1960).
16. Commissioner v. Gross, 236 F.2d 612 (2d Cir. 1956), affirming 23 T.C.
756 (1955). Here the Commissioner unsuccessfully contended that distributions
by building corporations out of proceeds of a FHA building loan to stockholders
who collaborated in the housing projects were in the nature of compensation
for services, taxable as ordinary income. See also W. H. Weaver, 25 T.C. 1067,
1084 (1956) ; George M. Gross, 23 T.C. 756 (1955), to the same effect. Compare
Arthur A. Lynch, 29 T.C. 1174 (1958). No case has been noted which holds that
the mere act of mortgaging out in the particular instance was not compensation,
but the failure of the court to find compensation in the situations involved in the
cases cited above is significant.
17. 56 Stat. 303 (1942), 12 U.S.C. § 1743 (1958).
18. 62 Stat. 1206 (1948), 12 U.S.C. §§ 1716-23 (1958). These are so-called
"Fanny May Mortgages."
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B. Second Principle
A voluntary sale of property for a price in excess of basis will
result in taxable income.19 An example would be Case I above if the
property is sold for anything over basis. It would also apply in Case
II above if it were sold for anything over basis. The mortgaging out
which is present in Case II is irrelevant.
C. Third Principle
A foreclosure sale of property at a price in excess of basis plus
expenses of sale results in taxable income.20 An example would be
Case II if the bid is in excess of the basis. Here also mortgaging out is
irrelevant.
D. Fourth Principle
Voluntary sale of the equity for something of value is deemed a
sale for the mortgage plus the amount of the equity. This is so at
least where the value of the property is not less than the amount of
the mortgage. One of the leading cases on this is Crane v. Commis-
sioner. 1
Here the taxpayer was the sole beneficiary under the will of her
husband. He owned at his death an apartment building subject to
a mortgage. The property was appraised for federal estate tax
purposes at a value exactly equal to the total amount of the encum-
brance. Taxpayer, after her husband's death, entered into an agree-
ment with the mortgagee whereby she was to continue operating the
property, collect the rents, pay necessary expenses, reserve $200
monthly for taxes, and remit the net rentals to the mortgagee. This
plan was followed for nearly seven years until, with the mortgagee
threatening foreclosure, petitioner sold to a third party for $3,000
cash, subject to the mortgage, and paid $500 expenses of sale. The
Commissioner determined a net taxable gain of $23,767.03 on the
theory that the property acquired and sold was not the equity, but
the physical property itself diminished by allowance depreciation of
$28,045.10. Since the total amount of the mortgage was added to
the $2,500 net cash receipts in order to determine the selling price,
this calculation gave a gain of $24,031.45 on the building, and a
19. This is the ordinary sale at a profit governed by Int. Rev. Code of 1954,
§ 1002, and is included here merely as a predicate for the Third Principle.
20. 5 Mertens, Law of Federal Income Taxation, § 30.84 n.66 (1956), citing
Mendham Corp., 9 T.C. 320 (1947) (Zimet & Ness rev. 1956).
21. 331 U.S. 1 (1946). Compare Simon v. Commissioner, 285 F.2d 422 (1960),
affirming 32 T.C. 935 (1959).
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capital loss of $528.85 on the land. The Supreme Court upheld the
Commissioner's contentions.-
A footnote in the Crane case states: "Obviously if the value of the
property is less than the amount of the mortgage, a mortgagor who
is not personally liable cannot realize the benefit equal to the
mortgage. 22 Accordingly, it has been argued 3 that where there is a
negative equity, as in Case IV, the sale of the equity may not neces-
sarily be deemed within the Fourth Principle. It should be observed,
however, that such a sale is dangerous and to be avoided where
possible.
V. RELATED PROBLEMS
Where a taxpayer as an individual has mortgaged out and is in
possession of funds upon which an income tax has not been paid, he
cannot merely allow the property to be foreclosed if, as will normally
be the case in such a situation, the foreclosure price will be in excess
of the basis and will, under the Third Principle mentioned above,
result in a closed transaction which may reflect income. We have
also seen under the Fourth Principle that he cannot make a voluntary
conveyance and part with the property prior to foreclosure in that
manner because this also will reflect income. He might consider
placing the property in a corporation of which he would own all of
the stock.
If this could be done successfully, he would have no income as a
result of the transfer to the corporation 24 and the corporation could
conceivably be formed with no other assets so that even though it
was in receipt of taxable gain as a result of the subsequent fore-
closure, it would have no assets with which to respond to the income
tax imposed on that gain.
Again the building contractor may have used the corporation
which does the mortgaging out, and in this event he would like to
have the corporation make a distribution of the excess cash resulting
from mortgaging out prior to the foreclosure so that when the fore-
closure took place, the corporation would be an empty shell and un-
able to pay the income tax levied on the constructive gain.
Here the builder would not expect to receive the proceeds entirely
tax free, but according to the Internal Revenue Code2r he would
presumably apply the proceeds first against the basis for the stock
of the corporation in his hands and the remainder would be taxed
at capital gains rates. This would be a much lighter burden than
22. Crane v. Commissioner, 331 U.S. 1, 14 n.37 (1946).
23. Lurie, supra note 3, at 71, 86.
24. Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 351.
25. Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 301(c) (3) (A).
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accepting the proceeds of the mortgaging out as ordinary income
and, of course, would be better than having the corporation taxed on
the gain resulting from the foreclosure sale under circumstances
whereby the corporation might well be held to be holding such assets
under such circumstances that the gain would be ordinary income to
the corporation and not capital gain.
Congress has done some "loophole closing" in a rather effective
manner so that it has become very difficult for the taxpayer who has
mortgaged out, either with or without utilizing a corporation, to cap-
ture effectually the fruits of his achievement and not be deprived of
them by subsequent events. We turn now to the special provisions
of the Internal Revenue Code above referred to.
Section 357(c)
Although under section 357 (a) of the Internal Revenue Code a
taxpayer is permitted to receive stock of a corporation under section
351 in an exchange for stock or securities and even have liabilities
assumed if the purpose is not a prohibited one, this is specifically
rendered inapplicable by section 357 (c) in those cases where the sum
of the liabilities assumed plus the liabilities to which property is
subject, exceeds the total of the adjusted basis of the property
transferred pursuant to the exchange. In such event the excess is
considered a gain from sale or exchange of a capital asset or of
property which is not a capital asset, as the case may be. But where
the property transferred is subject to the allowance for depreciation,
then by section 1239 (applicable to sale from an individual to a con-
trolled corporation) the gain from such a transfer is deemed to be
a gain from sale or exchange of property which is neither a capital
asset nor property described in section 1231. Section 1231 property
is property used in a trade or business and held for more than six
months. The net result is to deprive the gain of capital asset treat-
ment where the property transferred is subject to depreciation.
It will be seen that by reason of section 357 (c) a taxpayer is not
able to convey to a corporation in a tax free exchange, the property
which has been mortgaged. If the taxpayer had been able to do so,
as stated before, the corporation might have been substituted as the
obligor, (assuming that the taxpayer was not personally liable on the
mortgage) so that when the foreclosure sale took place, the profit
thereby reflected would be income to a corporation which might have
no other assets and, therefore, not be in any position to pay the in-
come tax thereby incurred. The net result of section 357(c) is that
the transfer itself brings down the house of cards and the taxpayer
making the transfer to the corporation incurs a gain or loss by that
very transfer.
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1961/iss2/2
WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY
Section 312(j)
Where a corporation mortgages out and the loan is guaranteed
by the United States, a distribution by the corporation is ordinary
income and not capital gains. Section 312 (j) specifically so states. -"
This applies regardless of the precentage of the loan guaranteed and
it applies to guarantees of FHA loans. It also applies to guarantees
of any other federal agency. It should be noted, however, that by sec-
tion 312 (j) (1) (B), the basis for this purpose only is not regarded as
reduced by depreciation. This remedy may not go far enough. "- For
example, it does not apply to loans not insured by the United States
Government, but by others, although the public policy involved would
seem to be the same. The dividends received credit under section 34
of the Internal Revenue Code does not apply. It has been suggested
that under section 341, the distribution of proceeds of mortgaging
out would be held to be made by a collapsible corporation.8
It will be observed that section 312 (j) is directed to a different
kind of tax reduction device. Here the corporation does the mort-
gaging out and the problem is to have a distribution by the corpora-
tion to the stockholders which will not be subject to taxation as an
ordinary dividend. The situation frequently arose under so-called
"608" real estate construction projects. After the construction was
completed, the builder would discover that his cost estimates were
high and that the particular corporation had funds remaining out of
the proceeds of the loan guaranteed by the FHA after defraying all
26. Mertens Code Commentary, § 312(j):1 (Zimet & Silverstein ed. 1956).
27. Mertens Code Commentary, § 312(j) :1 n.1 (Zimet & Silverstein ed. 1956).
28. Mertens Code Commentary, op. cit. supra note 26, suggests that this is
because it would doubtless be held that such a distribution was made by a
"collapsible corporation" and that the amount so received would be taxable at
ordinary income tax rates. This may not be self-evident. Observe that Int. Rev.
Code of 1954, § 341(a) (3), provides for treatment of certain distributions made
by a collapsible corporation as gain from the sale or exchange of property which
is not a capital asset. This eliminates the dividends received credit as to these
distributions. A distribution referred to is one which under § 301(c) (3) (A)
is treated, to the extent it exceeds the basis of the stock, in the same manner as
a gain from a sale or exchange of property. Section 301(c) (3) (A) provides in
general that the portion of a distribution which is not a dividend, to the extent
that it exceeds the adjusted basis of the stock, shall be treated as gain from
sale or exchange of property. Accordingly, the question reverts back to the
inquiry whether the distribution is from a collapsible corporation. Ordinarily
an apartment building, for example, would be "property" described in § 1231 (b),
which brings it within the purview of § 341(b) (3) (D) so that if it had been held
for less than three years it would (if the other requirements of § 341 are met)
be a collapsible corporation. If the foregoing is correct, the classification as a
collapsible corporation might be avoided by delaying the distribution out of the
proceeds of mortgaging out until three years from the completion of the project.
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of the costs of the project. Inasmuch as mortgaging out did not
result in income on its books, the corporation might have no earned
surplus and yet it would have funds which it could pay out to its
stockholders. This was the situation in Commissioner v. Gross.2 The
Court of Appeals of the Second Circuit held in 1956 that certain pro
rata cash distributions by the building corporations to the common
stockholders in 1948 and 1949 were to be applied first against basis,
and only the excess was to be taxable as long-term capital gain.
Inasmuch as under the Internal Revenue Code,30 a distribution can
be taxed as a dividend to the stockholders only if the corporation
possesses earnings and profits, section 312(j) creates earnings and
profits even though the corporation has not realized any gain. Im-
mediately prior to the distribution, earnings and profits are con-
sidered to be increased by the amount of the excess mortgage funds,
and immediately after the distribution, earnings and profits so
credited are reduced by the amount of the distribution.
It will be seen that this section places a substantial obstacle in the
way of the builder since he must either allow the windfall profits
arising out of mortgaging out to remain in the corporation, or must
accept them as an ordinary dividend, neither of which is very
palatable.
Even without section 312(j), it might well be with respect to
1950 or later years, that the provisions of the Internal Revenue Code
with respect to collapsible corporations would tax the amount of the
excess of the distribution over the stockholders' basis, as if it were a
dividend.
Section 311 (c)
The corporation which has succeeded in obtaining a windfall by
mortgaging out might contemplate distributing all of the property
to the stockholders. However, if it does so, under section 311 (c), a
gain will be recognized to the distributing corporation in an amount
equal to the excess by which the liability on the property exceeds the
adjusted basis of such property. There is a proviso that in the case
of a distribution of property subject to a liability which is not as-
sumed by the shareholder, the amount of gain to be recognized under
the preceding provision shall not exceed the excess, if any, of the
fair market value of such property over its basis. This is one more
instance of singling out mortgaging out situations and placing a
burden upon the taxpayer on account of a mortgaging out situation.
It will be observed here that the general rule of section 311 is that no
gain or loss shall be recognized to the corporation on the distribution
29. Note 16 supra.
30. Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 316.
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with respect to its stock or property. This is, of course, a different
question from recognizing gain or loss to the stockholders.
CONCLUSION
From the foregoing it will appear that: (1) Mortgaging out with-
out more does not result in taxable income. (2) However, if one
mortgages out property and then places it in a corporation, he is not
permitted to do this tax free even though he obtains eighty percent
or more of the stock. (3) A voluntary sale of property for a price in
excess of cost or basis will result in income and in this connection
the selling price of mortgaged property where the mortgage remains
on the property is the sum of the mortgage plus the amount paid for
the equity. (4) The same thing happens at a foreclosure sale, that
is, the selling price or amount bid for the property is compared with
the basis and if it is higher than the basis, it may result in taxable
income to the owner, who at that time is losing his property.
Suggested Precautions
When one has mortgaged out, he may feel tempted to let the prop-
erty go under a foreclosure sale. Before doing this, however, the
situation should be carefully analyzed to find out whether the Crane
situation is presented. This is for the reason that if the price bid at
the foreclosure sale, either by mortgagee or anyone else, is in excess
of the basis of the property in the hands of the mortgagor, the
difference, under the Crane doctrine, will be reportable as income.
It is true that in the Crane case, there was a voluntary conveyance
rather than a foreclosure sale. However, the reason that the tax-
payer was held to have received income was that there had been a
disposition and we have already seen above that a foreclosure sale is
also a disposition. It should be particularly noted that the basis must
be reduced by the amount of depreciation allowed or allowable. This
could be a very considerable sum and frequently it is found that the
basis so reduced by depreciation is less than the market value of the
property even though the market value of the property is less than
the amount of the mortgage.
If the taxpayer does not want to permit the property to be fore-
closed while he owns it, and is afraid to arrange a sale of it for any
valuable consideration, he may conclude that the only thing to do is
to abandon the property.
It may prove difficult to abandon the property, and, more important,
it is not clear that abandonment will serve to avoid the impact of the
Third Principle.31
It has been suggested 32 that a mortgagor who is not personally
obligated for the debt might give the property away and retain the
mortgage profits free of income tax liability and that this is the only
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means for making a disposition of the property without subjecting
excess mortgage money to taxation. The author cited points out that
although the donor of what he calls negative basis property may
avoid taxation of a mortgage profit,33 his successor in title to the
property may face liability if he inakes a taxable conveyance, and
that the owner may make a gift to a tax-exempt organization in~tead.
Even here the author cited cautions the reader that the donee
organization should not be one dealing in real estate lest it be deemed
to have "unrelated business income" as defined by section 512 of the
Internal Revenue Code.
31. 3 RIA 1960 1 M-3202 states that: "[TJhe First Circuit indicated in the
Parker case.., that the same rule would be applied even if the property had been
abandoned.. ." However, the opinion of the court refers to an abandonment
to the banks in the particular case, and it is not clear whether an abandonment,
generally speaking, is to be deemed equivalent to a "disposition" resulting in a
gain or loss.
32. Schlesinger, supra note 6, at 342.
33. Id. at 349.
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